In short, the resolution 1540 (2004) created a new bureaucracy to deal with issues related to non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction. This bureaucracy is now know as the 1540 Committee and it operates under the authority of the United Nation Security Council, as some sanctions committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee. As they put it in the forth operative clause: “Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, for a period of no longer than two years, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all members of the Council, which will, calling as appropriate on other expertise, report to the Security Council for its examination, on the implementation of this resolution”. This being the main action, there are still important elements that complement this resolution and its impacts on the current efforts of non-proliferation.
From the start, 1540 (2004) recognizes the “proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery” as a threat to international peace and security, therefore allowing for actions under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Afterwards, the preamble recognizes the importance of a 1992 Statement of the President of the UNSC (S/23500) as a calling for member State to fulfill their obligations related to arms control. They also reinforce twice during the preamble that all the actions to be taken related to the provisions of the resolutions have to constrained by the UN Charter. Also with relevance during the preamble is the stress on supporting multilateral treaties already established controlling weapons of mass destruction and also on enhancing coordination on “national, subregional, regional and international levels” to deal with the issues. There is also a clause that restates the possibility of international cooperation for peaceful usage of the technology involved in WMDs. The clause reads like an exercise in compromise with little definition of the type of cooperation or the issue of dual use technology. It reads “Affirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be used as a cover for proliferation,”.
It is also interesting that the preamble deals with the issue of terrorism and non-state actors, but in a shallow and timid fashion, in reality it calls for the usage of the list established by the United Nations under S/RES/1267 and S/RES/1373. A considerably crafty way of discussing the issue without going into the depths and to the nuts and bolts. In this same shallow way that the preamble and the resolution in general deals with trafficking, stating its grave concern with the situation and stating that it adds another dimension to the issue. Calls for cooperation and observance of the already established multilateral treaties populated multiples clauses in the preamble, including a call to member State to implement the treaties to which they are a party. There are still three elements that call attention in the preamble. Firstly, it talks about the “urgent need for all States to take additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery”, a generalization probably required to get the approval of the resolution. Secondly, it states the possibility of using all means under the Charter to combat the threat of proliferation and aimed a facilitating response to global threats in the area. Lastly, it is a resolution acting under the Chapter VII, the strongest language utilized at the UNSC.
The tone for the for the operative clauses is set by the first one in a very timid display of anti-terror policy, it states that “all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery”. In short, it does not require States to actively try to stop non-State actors to pursue weapons of mass destruction. As long as they do not receive support from the State, they are in observance of the 1540. The language on the second clause aims at closing the gap, calling for States to adopt legislation that prohibit that non-State actors “manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery”. Again, it does not require an active role on the part of the States in terms of disrupting possible non-State efforts. The third operative clause is also related to domestic safeguards, calling for controls, such as physical protection, accountability, safety for the WMDs and its means of delivery. It also calls for better border control to halt movement of related material.
On the forth operative clause that resides the central issue of S/RES/1540, which is the creation of a Committee of the Security Council to be made responsible for the implementation of national laws on non-proliferation in each member-State. It was supposed to last no longer than two year and it is composed by all the members of the Security Council as other Committees of the UNSC. It also calls for a first report from the States to be sent to the 1540 Committee within six months, as of 1977 (2011) there are still countries that have not sent their first report. In the accountability of WMD material, the resolution calls for national control lists in its sixth operative clause, but elaborates little on the issue.
Afterwards, there are many clauses that are dedicated to calling, encouraging the existing multilateral treaties that already try to regulate weapons of mass destruction and its means of delivery. It states clearly that the resolution does not interfere with obligations under other pieces of international law in the area. It is also enshrined in the resolution two interesting elements. Operative clause 7 calls States that can provide assistance to do so “to States may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution within their territories”. This assistance that the resolution discuss includes dealing with legal issues, technical issues in the implementation and even resources to comply with the resolution. In sum, one of the economic and technological transfers to which the United Nations seems to be so fond of. The second one is the call on States to try to prevent illicit trafficking of WMDs in international cooperation. The resolution closes expressing its future monitoring activities and remaining seized of the matter.
All in all, S/RES/1540 creates a bureaucracy that largely overlaps with other instruments that have already been established and that the very resolution supports. The 1540 Committee has little to zero unique functions, mainly because it does not aim to replace any of the functions that the multilateral treaties have and it does not have any new mechanisms of enforcement. Additionally, the resolution interestingly overlooks all the work that has been developed by the First Committee of the General Assembly on disarmament and WMDs. Another shortcoming of this resolution is that it is completely silent on dual use technology, which is one of the main issues in arms control negotiations dealing with WMDs. This silence is evident when the resolution discuss means of delivery, which in their definition is just products specially designed for those uses. The committee created seems to be at best redundant.
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