S/RES/1718 (2006) was written in the context of the test of a nuclear weapon by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and as such contains a considerable imposing language towards the test, but with little change of the status quo. The tone of the resolution calls for a return to the level of negotiations that existed before the nuclear test, with calls for return to the NPT, six-party talks. There is the establishment of Sanctions Committee and some punitive elements, but the main elements relate to the return to the previous negotiations that were taking place.
Preamble
The resolution initiates with a recall of its previous resolutions on issues related to non-proliferation, such as S/RES/1540 (2004), and reaffirming that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are a threat to international peace and security. It moves on the express the gravest concern at the conduction of a nuclear weapon test, which represents a test to the strength of the global regime of non-proliferation. A regime that in the eyes of the United Nations should be maintained and therefore they deplore the DPRK’s withdrawal from the Treaty and its refusal to return to the Six-Party talks. It further endorses a joint statement on the situation and the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns and show concern with the increased instability created by the test. The actions of S/RES/1718 (2006) are under Article 41 of the Chapter VII.
Operative Clauses
The resolution initiates with a condemnation of the test, with an alarm that the possible test would be considered a threat to international peace and security and would create a scenario of broad international condemnation for the test. Afterwards, it demands that the DPRK do not conduct further testing; retract its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT; that it return to the treaty; suspend its ballistic missile programs; and all other weapons of mass destruction and missile programs. Those are the requests that the Council posed to the government of North Korea.
The resolution also addresses that all Member States shall prevent the supply of armed vehicles, materials previously set in previous resolutions and luxury goods. These restrictions also apply to the exports made by the DPRK. In this regard, all Member States should work to prevent the transfer of those items to within Korea’s territory and also calls for a freezing of funds and other assets related to DPRK’s WMDs related elements. The Member States should also work to prevent the entry of persons designated by the Sanctions Committee to enter in their territory and allow the States to inspect cargo to and from the DPRK.
S/RES/1718 establishes that the freezing should not apply for basic expenses, extraordinary expenses and if it is necessary for judicial, administrative or arbitral lien; and also on case-by-case basis when the Sanctions Committee judges to be necessary. The Member States are called to report to the Security Council within thirty days of the adoption of this resolution’s elements. For that the resolution also establishes a Sanctions Committee that is supposed to deal with the sanctions being established under this resolution. The Committee will have as a role to information the actions being taken; take appropriate action on information regarding violations; consider and decide upon requests; determine additional items; designate additional individuals; promulgate guidelines and report at least every ninety days to the Council.
The resolution expresses concern and encourages all States to intensify their diplomatic efforts to try to not aggravate tension in the region. It further calls the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition and it also affirms that it will keep Korea’s action under continuous review and it will be remain seized of the matter. The resolution considers that further decisions will be required and additional measures might be necessary.
In sum
The S/RES/1718 (2006) deals with the establishment of a Sanctions Committee to address the issues as a reaction to the test that has taken place in late 2006. Notwithstanding, the type of sanctions do not seem to be enough to change the behavior of the DPRK leadership. This seems clear from the future resolutions that deal with non-proliferation in North Korea, such as S/RES/1874 (2009) and even S/RES/1985 (2011).
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